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February 1990 Riots in Tajikistan 
Who Was Behind the Scenes? 
Review of the Main Existing Versions
Parviz Mullojanov*
Introduction: Political Situation on the Eve of the February 
1990 Events
The major political event at the end of the perestroika (1985-1991) in 
the Soviet Socialist Republic (ssr) of Tajikistan was the elections for the 
Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the republic, scheduled for March 1990. In 
many senses, it was a turning point in the country’s political life because, 
for tСО irst tТmО, tСО ОlОctТons аОrО supposОН to СavО a rОlatТvОlв frОО 
character due to the weakened domination of the ruling Communist Party 
(cp). It is worth noting that by the end of perestroika, the republic was in 
deep economic crisis, which considerably raised the level of social tension. 
The call for elections gave reasonable hope to the leaders of the opposition 
movement Rastokhez1 and its supporters of entering the Supreme Soviet 
1 Rastokhez [revival in Tajik] was a political organisation in Tajikistan in the years of 
perestroika and civil war (1989-1997) with a programme of moderate national revival and 
democratic liberalism.
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as a sОparatО anН ТnluОntТal opposТtТonal factТon. TСО prОvТous вОar аas 
considered as one of the most successful for the movement. The demo-
crats considerably expanded their network in the regions, conducted their 
convening conference and established steady contacts and cooperation 
with similar national-democratic movements and parties of other Soviet 
republics. The enthusiastic Rastokhez leaders were counting on a mini-
mum of 20-30% of seats and, by autumn 1989, placed their popularisa-
tion and organisational activities on a much broader footing.2 At the end 
of December 1989, with the aim of enhancing its activities and ensuring 
faТr ОlОctТons, RastokСОг maНО an oficТal applТcatТon to tСО govОrnmОnt to 
conduct a large-scale pre-election meeting on February 18, 1990.
At the same time, and since the beginning of January 1990, the capital 
faced increasing rumours concerning the alleged arrival in Dushanbe of 
thousands of Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan (Kališevskij, 2010). All 
refugees were presumably provided with housing at the expense of local 
families on the municipal waiting list. There were also rumours that in 
Leninakan, in the Armenian ssr, local people burned and trampled Tajik 
national clothes that had been collected and delivered to the earthquake 
victims as humanitarian aid.3 The rumours spread via different channels, 
youth meetings in city-blocks, telephone calls to mosques, propaganda 
НurТng praвОrs, anН lОalОts Тn local unТvОrsТtТОs. For ТnstancО, a postОr аas 
iбОН on tСО ОntrancО Нoor to tСО PОНagogТcal InstТtutО stuНОnts’ cafОtОrТa. 
As аas latОr rОvОalОН bв oficТal ТnvОstТgatТons, tСО ТnformatТon about tСО 
refugees was disseminated during preaching in several mosques. The date 
of the future anti-refugee meeting was also openly disseminated to the 
public from the end of January. There were calls and advertisements to 
participate in a protest meeting to be held on February 11, 1990 in front of 
the Central Committee building (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 180).
TСО rumours causОН rТsТng concОrn anН a loа of аarnТngs anН rОquОsts 
to oficТal boНТОs from botС orНТnarв cТtТгОns anН publТc assocТatТons. TСus, 
several days before the events, the Rastokhez leadership had an internal 
meeting to discuss these rumours. As a result, on February 9, a warning 
2 Interview with Mirbobo Mirrakhimov, one of the founders and a prominent leader of 
Rastokhez, June 23, 2013.
3 The Spitak earthquake (also called Leninakan earthquake and Gyumri earthquake) 
occurred in the Northern region of the rss of Armenia on December 7, 1988. Humanitarian 
aid items were collected and sent to the earthquake victims from all republics of the ussr.
249February 1990 Riots in Tajikistan
letter was drafted and sent by Rastokhez to the government with a request 
to inform the population as soon as possible about the real situation with 
the refugees in order to prevent potential disturbances. At about the same 
time, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan4 decided not to participate 
in the upcoming public meeting, with a fear that the rumours were a “kgb 
trap.”5 Therefore, although several imams were sympathetic to Rastokhez 
and participated both in propaganda meetings and activities, the majority 
of its leaders did not take part in the demonstration. In his statement made 
several months after the February events, the Prosecutor of the Tajik ssr 
Gennadij Mikhailin asserted that, on February 9, a group of criminal leaders 
gathered in one of the city cafeterias to plan the organisation of large-scale 
НТsturbancОs, allОgОНlв joТnОН bв somО top-lОvОl oficТals (ibid., p. 204). 
However, neither the government, nor the law enforcement bodies under-
took any preventive measures and the rumours continued until the last day.
The Sequence of February 1990 Events
AltСougС tСО oficТal НatО of tСО bОgТnnТng of tСО FОbruarв ОvОnts Тs 
FОbruarв 11, tСО irst groups of protОstors attОmptОН to organТsО a mООt-
ing on February, 10 but failed to attract more than a hundred people 
(Anonymous, 2014). On February 11 at approximately 11:30am, a crowd 
gathered in front of the Council of Ministers building in Lenin square and, 
soon after, moved to a square in front of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Tajikistan (cpt), on the crossroads of Lenin avenue 
and Putovskij street. The crowd was initially small and did not exceed 200 
people. However, the demonstrators soon blocked the road and stopped 
trafic anН tСО squarО startОН to ill up аТtС passОrs-bв anН curТous onlook-
ers. According to various estimations, by the afternoon the number of dem-
onstrators had increased to up to 2,000 people, since many students from 
the nearby Pedagogical Institute walked through the square after classes 
and joined the public meeting (Kališevskij, 2010).
TСО НОmonstrators НОmanНОН clarТicatТon of tСО rumours tСat ArmОnТan 
refugees would be provided with housing from the waiting list at the 
4 The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (irpt or Hiгbi Nahгati Islomii Todžikiston 
in Tajik) was a branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party of the Soviet Union, founded in 
1990 in Moscow, and therefore under strict kgb surveillance and control. It separated and 
became an independent political party in 1991.
5 Interview with an irpt Deputy Chairman at the time of the riots, September 9, 2012.
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ОбpОnsО of local famТlТОs. TuraНžonгoНa, tСО СОaН of Kaziât – tСО ofi-
cial spiritual administration of Tajikistan’ Muslims – managed to calm the 
mООtТng partТcТpants Нoаn. TСОв inallв lОft tСО squarО at approбТmatОlв 
2pm on the condition that the authorities would provide complete answers 
to all their questions within the next 24 hours. On the same day, Moscow 
sОnt sОvОral mТlТtarв unТts to DusСanbО: 790 igСtОrs of tСО “Alfa” spОcТal 
force unit and 1,068 troops, mostly paratroopers. They joined local forc-
es, including militia units and troops of the Dushanbe garrison and the 
201-Motor RТlО DТvТsТon statТonОН pОrmanОntlв Тn TajТkТstan (Davlatov & 
Mamadšoev, 2012).
On February 12, the public meeting restarted at 3pm.The crowd soon 
illОН not onlв tСО squarО but also nОarbв strООts, brТngТng tСО numbОr of 
actТvО НОmonstrators to 5,000. TСО irst clasСОs bОtаООn protОstОrs anН 
security forces soon occurred. Troops started to use teargas, several gre-
nades exploded in front of the Sport shop located nearby. The crowd was 
dispersed but soon returned to the square and clashes continued (idem). By 
approбТmatОlв 3:30pm, troops opОnОН irО. AccorНТng to аТtnОssОs, onО of 
tСО irst vТctТms аas NТkТta Matrosov, a rОportОr from Moscoа аСo аas 
takТng pТcturОs from tСО tСТrН loor of a buТlНТng locatОН Тn front of tСО 
cpt Central Committee. At the same time, a local resident was shot in her 
kТtcСОn locatОН on tСО sОconН loor of tСО samО buТlНТng. AccorНТng to tСО 
polТcО ТnvОstТgatТon, tСОв аОrО botС kТllОН bв sСots irОН from tСО roof of 
the cpt Central Committee (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 204).
Soon aftОr, TajТkТstan’s oficТals trТОН to appОal to tСО croаН. OtakСon 
LatТi, НОputв CСaТrman of tСО CouncТl of MТnТstОrs, maНО a spООcС аСТcС 
was not welcomed. At 4pm, cpt First Secretary Kahhor Mahkamov, 
appОarОН at tСО squarО for tСО irst tТmО anН trТОН to gТvО a spООcС. 
Demonstrators were already outraged and somebody from the crowd threw 
a galosh and then a stone at his face. Mahkamov was forced to interrupt 
his speech and retreat with his bodyguards inside the building. Almost 
immediately thereafter, shooting resumed, causing at least six deaths and 
about seventy injured. In response, the crowd dispersed from the square to 
Lenin and Putovskij streets, shouting for weapons and revenge. Moving 
down the streets, protesters started to attack Russian passers-by and local 
women dressed like Europeans, loot shops, and burn vehicles. During the 
evening at least twenty-two shops, twenty-two restaurants and cafes, two 
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cinemas, two banks, three militia vehicles, three ambulances, two trucks, 
and one trolleybus were reportedly destroyed or looted. As a result, at 6pm 
the government declared a state of emergency in the capital (idem).
Later in the evening, Mahkamov delivered a speech on republican tele-
vision. He appealed to the population of Dushanbe to organise self-defence 
units all over the city in order to save property and lives and counter the 
actТon of lootОrs. HТs spООcС gavО tСО populatТon of DusСanbО tСО oficТal 
green light to organise their own protection, covering all districts and city-
blocks of the capital. The self-defence units were organised on a territo-
rial basis and included representatives of all ethnic groups. Each block 
was guarded by locals armed with sticks, reinforced steel, axes and other 
improvised arms.
On February 13, the demonstration started at 10am and was soon dis-
persed by the army and the police. A crowd of 20,000 to 30,000 people 
gathered again at 1:30pm. This time, their slogans were exclusively polit-
ical and anti-governmental. The protesters demanded that the government 
rОsТgn, tСat oficТals rОsponsТblО for tСО usО of arms agaТnst tСОm bО pun-
ished, that the sixty detainees arrested earlier by police be released, and 
tСat funОrals bО organТsОН for tСosО kТllОН. At tСО samО tТmО, DžamšОН 
Karimov, First Secretary of the Dushanbe City cpt Executive Committee 
and a group of his subordinates attempted to walk up to the square. The 
oficТals got as far as tСО RussТan Drama TСОatrО MaвakovskТ, locatОН 
one block away from the square, when shooting began and the crowd dis-
pОrsОН. TСО oficТals аОrО forcОН to lОavО as аОll, actuallв takТng tСО lОaН 
in running from the shooting.
At 6.45pm, the crowd began to organise itself again. Leadership was 
inallв takОn bв a group of tСО most actТvО protОstОrs. Among tСОm tСОrО 
аОrО sОvОral аОll-knoаn igurОs, cТvТc lОaНОrs anН orНТnarв cТtТгОns. 
TСОв formОН a “CommТttОО of 17,” latОr oficТallв rОnamОН Vakhdat 
[Unity], intended to convey the demonstrators’ demands to the repub-
lic’s leaders. Buri Karimov, Minister of Construction and Transport, and 
deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was designated to lead the 
“Committee of 17.” Paradoxically thus, the demonstrators selected a top 
lОvОl oficТal to bО tСОТr rОprОsОntatТvО Тn nОgotТatТons аТtС tСО govОrnmОnt. 
Afterwards Karimov insisted that he was asked and convinced personally 
by the cpt First Secretary Mahkamov to play the role of mediator and to 
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lead the Committee (Karimov, 1997). Indeed, Karimov was a well-known 
anН popular igurО of tСО TajТk ssr at that time. As the youngest minister 
in the country, he was seen as an innovator and for many demonstrators 
symbolised perestroika and a new generation of reformists in the ruling 
elite. In addition, he was originally from the Gharm region (Centre) and 
in public opinion was associated with internal opposition, challenging the 
domination of Northern Leninobod province in power structures.6 The 
Committee drafted a “List of twenty demands” for the government. The 
main claim was the resignation of the three political leaders of the repub-
lic: cpt First Secretary Kahhor Mahkamov, Supreme Soviet Chairman 
Goibnazar Pallaev, and Council of Ministers Chairman Izotullo Haëev.
In the morning of February 14, an urgent Plenum of the cpt Central 
Committee was held to discuss the current issue. Soon afterwards, talks 
between the “Committee of 17” and leading representatives of the republic 
started. The main subject of the negotiations was the resignation of the 
govОrnmОnt. HoаОvОr, tСО tСrОО top lОvОl oficТals stronglв objОctОН to tСО 
accusations made against them and refused to resign. They were supported 
by Vladimir Petkel’, head of the Tajik kgb, whereas Boris Pugo, a top level 
Moscow representative, insisted on their resignation. His position turned 
the scales and within a few hours an agreement was reached and a Protocol 
sТgnОН to conirm tСО rОsТgnatТon of MaСkamov, PallaОv, anН HaщОv. It аas 
also agrООН tСat tСО folloаТng tСrОО Нaвs аoulН bО НОclarОН publТc anН ofi-
cial mourning days during which time all public demonstrations and rallies 
would be prohibited (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 204). However despite 
tСОsО progrОss, bв 8pm, tСО clasСОs contТnuОН. TСО armв usОН irОarms anН 
several more protesters were killed and wounded.
Right after the conclusion of the meeting, the deputy Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers Buri Karimov and the Minister of Culture Nur Tabarov 
decided to move forward and push for cadre changes. They also tried to 
convince several other members of the government to issue a Decree of the 
Council of Ministers calling for the resignation of Izotullo Haëev and the 
appointment of Buri Karimov in his place. However, they did not take into 
6 During the last decades of the Soviet era, the power structures in Tajikistan were dominated 
by the descendants from Northern Leninobod province. This domination was increasingly 
opposed by internal political factions from the Southern mountainous regions including 
Gharm. The furious competition for power between various regional factions was one of the 
main distinguishing features of the perestroika period in Soviet Tajikistan.
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account that in order to be validated, the Protocol of resignation had to be 
approvОН bв tСО rОlОvant oficТal boНТОs: MaСkamov’s rОsТgnatТon СaН to 
bО conirmОН bв tСО PlОnum of tСО cpt Central Committee, Haëev’s by the 
Council of Ministers and Pallaev’s by the Supreme Soviet (idem).
This internal intrigue caused additional turmoil within the government 
anН tСО top lОvОl structurОs of tСО CommunТst Partв. SОvОral oficТals sup-
ported Buri Karimov, who allegedly insisted that his candidature had already 
been approved by the Moscow leadership, including Mikhail Gorbachev. 
LatОr, tСosО oficТals аСo sougСt to Сurrв to ТmplОmОnt tСО Moscoа НОcТ-
sion that evening were accused of anti-State plotting and were punished. The 
majorТtв of oficТals inallв НОcТНОН to аaТt sОvОral morО Нaвs. TСО ОnsuТng 
coursО of ОvОnts justТiОН tСОТr cautТousnОss as, bв tСО nОбt Нaв, tСО tСrОО 
lОaНОrs аСo sТgnОН tСО Protocol of rОsТgnatТon oficТallв announcОН tСat Тt 
was invalid and continued to work until the cpt Plenum.
Such an abrupt change in leadership behaviour has always been a 
source of debate among observers, the majority believing that the three 
oficТals nОvОr ТntОnНОН to lОavО anН tСО conclusТon of tСО Protocol of 
resignation was just a tactical measure aimed at saving time. The recent-
ly published memoirs of Russian General Valerij Vorotnikov, head of the 
“Alfa” special force unit at the time of the events, have shed some light 
on the case. According to the General, Moscow gave its position concern-
ing the resignation of the three leaders after the Protocol had been signed. 
Most probably the federal authorities initially approved of the resignation 
and even agreed on the appointment of Buri Karimov, which explains his 
sОlf-coniНОncО anН pОrsТstОnt bОСavТour aftОr tСО Protocol conclusТon. It Тs 
suggested, however, that the Moscow leadership then changed its opinion 
bв tСО ОnН of tСО samО Нaв. TСТs аas also a sТgn tСat Moscoа inallв НОcТН-
ed to adopt a hard-line and uncompromising policy of suppression towards 
tСО НОmonstrators (MlОčТn, s.Н.).
On FОbruarв 15-17, a sОrТОs of oficТal mООtТngs аОrО organТsОН НurТng 
the mourning days, and on February 18, despite preventative measures, the 
demonstration restarted. From the morning, thousands of people started 
to gather again near the building of the cpt Central Committee. However, 
police detachments and army units blocked the road and the demonstra-
tors were not allowed to move to the square. The crowd walked several 
kilometres down along Putovskij street until it reached the Borbad concert 
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hall. About 15,000 people occupied a construction foundation pit and hold 
a meeting. This time, speakers openly criticised the existing power sharing 
system and the domination of Leninobodis in administration. It was actual-
lв tСО irst publТc, anН ratСОr raНТcal, manТfОstatТon of ТntОr-rОgТonal rТvalrв. 
One of the speakers stated: “Is it true that only women from Leninobod 
arО ablО to gТvО bТrtС to FТrst SОcrОtarТОs [of tСО TajТk CommunТst Partв]?” 
The statement immediately spread throughout the country, cited by a num-
ber of pro-government publications, dividing the North from the South 
and causing frustration on one side and excitement on the other. Many 
observers believe that this was the day that the democrats lost their support 
of the North. In addition, in Leninobod, rumours were spreading that “in 
Dushanbe the democrats are hunting Leninobodis on the streets and burn-
ing the vehicles with Leninobod plates” (Karimov, 1998). 
The meeting continued for several hours but without clashes or shoot-
ings. The meeting then calmly broke up and demonstrators left the area. 
According to the meeting leaders, the protests could no longer continue for 
fear of causing major casualties. The overall situation was already com-
pletely under army and police control, and the number of security units had 
considerably increased due to an urgent airlift of additional detachments 
from outside of the republic. As a result, February 18 was to be the last day 
of the February events in Dushanbe.
The Aftermath of the February 1990 Events
February 1990 is considered a turning point in the political, social and 
economic life of the republic. Prior to the events, Soviet Tajikistan was 
widely considered as an island of stability, a symbol of unchanging society 
left forever behind. The disturbances brought with them complete social 
transformation, political unpredictability, as well as abrupt and frequent 
changes of events. It was actually the beginning of a descent into a deepe-
ning crisis and ensuing civil confrontation.
The main political consequence of the events was a large-scale and 
irreversible discrediting of the Rastokhez movement in the eyes of a wide 
strata of tСО populatТon. From tСО irst mass mОНТa publТcatТons anН covО-
rage onwards, Rastokhez was directly and indirectly described as the main 
ТnstТgator of unrОst. AlrОaНв НurТng tСО top-lОvОl oficТal mООtТngs СОlН on 
February 14-18, extensively covered by mass media – both in the republic 
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anН Тn Moscoа –, tСО majorТtв of spОakОrs, oficТals anН rОprОsОntatТvОs of 
the law enforcement bodies openly accused Rastokhez of organising and 
lОaНТng tСО НОmonstrators. EvОn a part of tСО oficТal IslamТc clОrgв аas 
mobilised by state propaganda. In mass media and during preaching, some 
members of the clergy publicly interpreted the word “Rastokheг” [revival] 
as “Kiëmat” [resurrection], stating that under this name the organisation 
would lead people to social and political apocalypse.7
It is little wonder that the impact of such large-scale propaganda, 
coupled with public shock and common frustration, was devastating for 
Tajik democrats, ruining the image and political prospects of the move-
ment. Many local and foreign observers are surprised today by the rapid 
loss of public support for Rastokhez and its inability to withstand pressure 
and effectively deny at least the main part of accusations. However, it is 
necessary to take into account the degree to which the public in general 
was upset by the violent events, especially the attacks on innocent civilians 
on the streets, the looting and beatings. After several decades of stability 
and social calm, such deeds were perceived as particularly brutal. More 
importantly, and due to the Soviet media and state propaganda machine, 
tСО populatТon startОН to afilТatО tСО Сorror of tСО FОbruarв ОvОnts Обclu-
sively with Rastokhez. And many Rastokhez leaders and ordinary acti-
vists were equally stunned by the events as the image of outraged crowds 
on the streets was very different to their idealistic picture of protesting 
citizens. This shock and frustration, coupled with the increasing pressure 
from security agencies, considerably limited the organisation’s ability to 
conduct counter-propaganda.
As a result, Rastokhez was forced to considerably reduce its activities 
due to the overall atmosphere of suspicion. A number of its members aban-
doned positions as they were fearing state repression. Dozens of activists 
bОcamО subjОcts of oficТal ТnvОstТgatТons, manв bОТng forcОН to rОsТgn or 
to move to another job. For example, Mahmadali Khait and Olim Zarobek, 
tаo аОll-knoаn journalТsts from tСО rОpublТcan tОlОvТsТon, аОrО irОН for a 
series of pro-oppositional reports.
In addition, the government decided not to suspend the state of emergen-
cy decreed in the capital on the second day of disturbances. This decision 
7 Interview with Mahmadali Khait, journalist and member of Rastokhez, September 8, 2012.
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was explained as a preventive measure aimed at averting any destabilisa-
tion during the forthcoming elections for the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik 
ssr. The government also used this ground to reject proposals to postpone 
the elections. They were held in March 1990 under the state of emergency 
and with a discredited opposition. It is not surprising therefore, that the 
new Supreme Soviet was overwhelmingly dominated by representatives 
of the Communist Party.8
The most negative impact of the February events was the emigration 
of the Russian-speaking population from Tajikistan to other parts of the 
ussr. Emigration had started long before the 1990’s for purely economic 
rОasons anН concОrnОН mostlв вoung profОssТonals from tСО scТОntТic anН 
engineering sectors. It temporarily increased after the adoption in 1989 of 
the “Law on the language”,9 but after the February events, the migration 
loа out of tСО rОpublТc amplТiОН stОaНТlв.
Oficial Investigations of the February Events
After the outbreak of disturbances, the state and law enforcement bodies 
publicly announced their plans to conduct a comprehensive investigation 
to identify the main causes and organisers of the events. In the meantime, 
ОvОn НurТng tСО vОrв irst Нaвs, prОlТmТnarв Нata anН ТnformatТon аas 
publicly disseminated at the Politburo Plenum and other political mee-
tings and widely broadcasted on television. Many of the announced facts 
and data were later proved to be incorrect. For instance, the head of the 
Tajik kgb Vladimir Petkel’ and the Prosecutor of the Tajik ssr Gennadij 
Mikhailin stated initially that the crowd “overturned a bread transportation 
vehicle and trampled the bread loaves” (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 180). 
TСО oficТal ТnvОstТgatТon provОН tСat tСО ТnformatТon on tramplОН brОaН 
loaves had been fabricated. Investigations went on to prove that informa-
tion broadly disseminated in the central mass media concerning a “raped 
pregnant Russian woman” and “a child thrown into the river” was also 
8 94% of the newly elected Supreme Soviet deputies were members of the Communist 
Party, of which 25% were former chairmen of Party committees (partkoms), 30% were 
heads of state enterprises and ministries, with only two workers, one farmer, two teachers 
anН onО scСolar (Panilov, 1993).
9 The Law on the language adopted by the Supreme Soviet in July 1989 made Tajik an 
oficТal languagО. TСО laа аas stronglв opposОН bв tСО local RussТan spОakТng populatТon 
and intelligentsia.
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untruО. It аas also rОvОalОН tСat tСО laа ОnforcОmОnt boНТОs artТicТallв 
ТncrОasОН tСО amount of inancТal loss as аОll as tСО quantТtв anН tСО cost 
of the goods lost from the destroyed shops (idem).
According to the ministry of Health of the Tajik ssr and investigation 
data on the events:
813 citizens applied for medical treatment: 56.5% of ethnic Russians and 
43.5% of Central Asians. […] 25 people were killed: 21 were shot, 2 were 
stabbed with a knife and in 2 cases the reason of death is not given. In terms 
of ethnicity of the 25 dead people: 16 Tajiks, 5 Russians, 2 Uzbeks, 1 Tatar 
and 1 Azeri (ibid., pp. 196-198).
Investigation commissions and journalists agree that the February 
events were not spontaneous, but a well-planned and thoroughly organised 
actТon. HoаОvОr, not onО of tСО oficТal ТnvОstТgatТons coulН clОarlв ansаОr 
tСО most Тmportant quОstТons: аСat forcОs аОrО bОСТnН tСО ОvОnts? аСo 
organТsОН tСО НТsturbancОs? Сoа, anН for аСat rОasons?
SОvОral oficТal commТssТons аОrО sОt up to aННrОss tСОsО quОstТons. 
Firstly, the kgb investigation team started working during the events. Its 
report was presented to the authorities, both in Moscow and Dushanbe. 
As they were never disseminated in public, only a few aspects have been 
revealed. The kgb investigators initially accused Rastokhez but later 
blamОН a group of unoficТal clОrgв anН sОvОral top lОvОl oficТals. TСО 
Prosecutor of the Tajik ssr conducted its own investigation, the prelimi-
nary results of which were presented to the Supreme Soviet in December 
1990, after almost a year of inquiries. The report actually only presents the 
actТvТtТОs anН crТtТquОs of tСО TajТk НОmocrats anН unoficТal clОrgв.
The third commission was organised right after the events by the 
Presidium of the Tajik Supreme Soviet. It included twelve deputies, 
representing all ethnic groups of the republic. Its investigation started late 
due to the unwillingness of law enforcement bodies, especially the Tajik 
ProsОcutor OficО anН tСО kgb, to cooperate and respond to the commis-
sТons’ ТnquТrТОs. АТtСТn a fОа montСs, tСО commТssТon proНucОН a inal 
report, which was not published inside the republic. Without providing any 
information on who was behind the events, the commission concluded that 
nОТtСОr tСО RastokСОг movОmОnt, nor sОvОral top lОvОl oficТals poТntОН 
out of anti-government plotting by the kgb were actually involved in the 
organisation of the February events (Karimov, 1997).
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Due to the limited success of the three republican commissions, the 
central authorities decided to undertake a new investigation under the 
direct control of the General Prosecutor in Moscow. Initiated by Oleg 
LТtvak, Тt аas contТnuОН anН complОtОН bв SolТНžon DžuraОv, botС bОТng 
SОnТor InvОstТgators of tСО GОnОral ProsОcutor OficО. TСОв СОaНОН a joТnt 
investigation team consisting of a hundred professionals from local law 
enforcement bodies, militia, kgb anН tСО ProsОcutor OficО of tСО TajТk ssr 
(Davlatov & Mamadšoev, 2012). The report was submitted to the General 
Prosecutor and to the cp CОntral CommТttОО. Onlв rОcОntlв, DžuraОv Сas 
revealed some of the major conclusions of the investigation team in several 
public interviews. According to him, there were evidences of the central 
kgb oficО ТnvolvОmОnt Тn organТsТng ОvОnts, falsТfвТng ТnvОstТgatТon Нata 
and putting pressure on the other investigation teams (idem).
In aННТtТon to tСОsО oficТal ТnvОstТgatТons, Тt sСoulН bО notОН tСat sОvО-
ral journalists have inquired and published about the February events, 
rОlОctТng НТffОrОnt posТtТons anН opТnТons. HoаОvОr, nonО of tСО pro-
mТnОnt igurОs mОntТonОН Тn tСО ТnvОstТgatТon rОports anН publТcatТons аas 
prosecuted.
An Analysis of the Main Versions and Possible Scenarios
A tСorougС analвsТs of tСО ОбТstТng publТc anН oficТal ТnvОstТgatТons, 
publications and memoirs devoted to the February Events highlights the 
following four main versions of who was behind the scenes:
Version 1: Rastokhez and National Democrat Leaders
TСТs аas tСО oficТal vОrsТon НОvОlopОН anН promotОН bв tСО laа Оnfor-
cement agencies, primarily the kgb and the Tajik Prosecutor Gennadij 
Mikhailin. According to him, the main signs were the active presence of 
Rastokhez prominent leaders during the events, and the fact that 8 out of 
14 members of Vakhdat (the committee created by demonstrators) were 
representatives of Rastokhez. In addition, ordinary members of Rastokhez 
are alleged of spreading rumours about the refugees and calling for partici-
pation in the protests (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 240).
However, since the beginning there were a number of reliable arguments 
against this version, which made it untenable. Firstly, none of the investiga-
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tТon tОams coulН inН ОvТНОncО of RastokСОг ТnvolvОmОnt Тn tСО organТsatТon 
of tСО unrОst to sОrvО as a basТs for lОgal prosОcutТon. In СТs inal statОmОnt to 
the Supreme Soviet, Mikhailin used a vague wording, as follows:
TСО lОaНОrs of RastokСОг anН unoficТal clОrgв arО tСО organТsОrs of conНТ-
tions which led to the destabilisation of the socio-political situation, rise of 
tОnsТons Тn ТntОr-ОtСnТc rОlatТons anН inallв all tСТs togОtСОr аТtС otСОr rОa-
sons led to the mass disturbances (idem).
SОconНlв, tСО vОrsТon НТН not takО Тnto account tСО afinТtв bОtаООn TajТk 
anН ArmОnТan НОmocratТc organТsatТons. In 1988-1990, НurТng tСО conlТct 
that opposed Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Tajik 
national democrats predominantly sympathised with the Armenian side, 
mostly due to their shared anti-Pan-Turkism ideology. Rastokhez represent-
atives used to back Armenian delegations in all gatherings and conferences 
organised in the ussr. In January 1989, at a joint conference held in Vilnius 
under the guidance of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis Reform Movement, the Tajik 
and Armenian delegations agreed to support each other’s positions in the 
future. The friendly relation continued even after the February events. For 
instance, representatives of Armenian organisations supported Mirbobo 
Mirrahimov, a founder member of Rastokhez, in the publication in 1991 
of the report of the Supreme Soviet investigation commission. Two former 
members of the Armenian diaspora in Tajikistan guarded Mirrahimov and 
the editor of the Sogdiana newspaper Parviz Mullojanov on their way to 
the Sąjūdis printing house in Vilnius. On February 12, 1990, Armenian 
representatives of several nationalist organisations arrived in Dushanbe 
to assist in evacuating local Armenians and investigating on the anti- 
Armenian disturbances. Although security agencies persistently pointed to 
MТrraСТmov anН sОvОral otСОr lОaНТng igurОs of tСО TajТk opposТtТon, tСО 
Armenian group came to the conclusion that neither Tajik democrats nor 
Islamists were responsible for the events.10
According to Rastokhez leaders, their decision to participate in the 
February demonstrations was made with the hope of shifting the crowds’ 
attention from the Armenian refugees to the Tajik authorities. They man-
aged to achieve this on February 12, when the most prominent democratic 
activists joined the rally. Slogans immediately assumed an openly anti- 
10 Interview, Moscow, July 1993.
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government character and the issue of Armenian refugees was silenced.11 
In addition, it should be recalled that, since December 1989, Rastokhez 
was preparing a large meeting scheduled for February 18, to which the 
national democrats attached special importance. With this in mind, what 
reason would they have to destabilise the situation in the capital just several 
Нaвs bОforО tСОТr oаn largО-scalО actТon? AnН аТtС rОgarНs to tСО upcom-
ing elections, what was the reason for democrats to threaten the electoral 
procОss аСОn tСОТr succОss sООmОН cОrtaТn?
Version 2: Tajik Islamists
TСТs Тs actuallв a lТp-sТНО of tСО prОvТous vОrsТon НОvОlopОН bв tСО kgb 
anН tСО TajТk ProsОcutor anН аas pusСОН forаarН аСОn tСО irst vОrsТon 
faТlОН (Ûsui, 2011). In СТs abovО mОntТonОН rОport, MТkСaТlТn namОН sОvО-
ral clergymen, mostly Imam-Khatibs (mosque leaders) from Dushanbe and 
the nearby Lenin district, some of whom were later prosecuted. A leading 
members of the Tajik opposition made the following main arguments 
against this version:
FТrst, Тt Тs аТНОlв accОptОН tСat all of tСО sТgnТicant mosquОs, ОspОcТallв 
tСosО locatОН Тn tСО capТtal, СaН bООn unНОr closО survОТllancО of botС oficТal 
structures and the kgb. More or less all important clergymen were also being 
closely monitored. The question is how could the kgb and other related 
agencies overlook such large scale preparations supposedly ongoing in the 
controllОН mosquОs НurТng tСО coursО of almost onО montС anН a Сalf? AnН Тf 
tСОв НТН not ovОrlook tСОm, tСОn аСв аОrО tСО ОvОnts not prОvОntОН?12
The same argument applies to political Islam, represented by the 
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (irpt). SТncО tСОТr irst arrОsts Тn 
1986, all Islamist activists were closely monitored, every step observed. 
A formОr promТnОnt oficТal ОmploвОО stТpulatОН tСat irpt leader Said 
Abdullo Nuri even requested the removal of the cameras installed in his 
bedroom because “it contradicts Islamic moral norms.”13 By 1990, all Tajik 
Islamists had emerged from the underground and were openly conducting 
their activities, making the surveillance process much easier. It is still not 
11 Interview with Mirbobo Mirrakhimov, June 2012.
12 Interview, Moscow, 1996.
13 IntОrvТОа аТtС onО of tСО formОr sОnТor oficТals from tСО StatО CommТttОО on RОlТgТon of 
the Tajik ssr, Dushanbe, October 1995.
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clear, therefore, how the law enforcement agencies could miss the primary 
objectives of their surveillance targets in such favourable conditions.
In addition, the Tajik Islamists opposed participation in the meetings 
anН publТclв НОinОН tСОm as “tСО kgb trap.” Most leaders did not show up 
in the square and appealed to the crowd to go home. This probably explains 
why charges against the irpt аОrО nОvОr brougСt Тn publТc. All oficТal 
reports limited their accusations to the names of clergy individuals or used 
tСО unclОar tОrm “unoficТal clОrgв.”
Version 3: Top Level Oficials
The version suggests that the plotting group planned to overthrow cpt 
First Secretary Kahhor Mahkamov with the support of local criminal lea-
ders and the opposition. It was presented at the Plenum of the cpt Central 
Committee on February 14 and it was repeated in later political meetings held 
on February 15-18. It stated that the conspirators included Izotullo Haëev, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Buri Karimov, Minister of Construction 
and Transport, Nur Tabarov, Minister of Culture, Nurullo Khuvajdulloev, 
head of the cpt Political Department, Mazkhabšo Mukhabbatšoev, editor-
in-chief of Kommunist Tadžikistana, anН sОvОral otСОr СТgС rankТng oficТals. 
The Plenum decided to dismiss them from their positions and recommended 
that law enforcement agencies carry out a detailed investigation in order to 
НОtОrmТnО аСОtСОr tСО accusОН oficТals аОrО guТltв.14
FurtСОr ТnvОstТgatТons НТН not conirm tСО conclusТons of tСО PlОnum. 
The Supreme Soviet investigation commission stated that all of the above 
mentioned persons had no involvement in organising the unrest:
Buri Karimov and Nur Tabarov, after conclusion of the Protocol of resigna-
tion of the Party and government leadership, being unaware of the nuances 
of legislation and considering the Protocol to be valid, agreed with each other 
and decided to take advantage of the situation […] but there is no evidence 
of their involvement in the preparation of the events (Nazriev & Sattorov, 
2002, p. 203).
The same conclusion was reached by the General Prosecutor joint 
investigation team. Many facts presented by law enforcement agencies, 
especially by the kgb, аОrО not conirmОН НurТng tСО coursО of tСО ТnvОs-
14 Interview with Usmon Davlat, irpt Deputy Chair.
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tigation. For instance, according to kgb information, Izotullo Haëev had 
a secret meeting on February 9 with Rauf Saliev and Âkub Salimov, two 
prominent criminal bosses. This accusation was based on the testimony of 
a waitress of the cafeteria where the meeting was taking place. However, 
аСОn quОstТonОН bв tСО ТnvОstТgators of tСО GОnОral ProsОcutor OficО, 
she confessed that the she accepted to give a false testimony in return for 
permission to emigrate from the ussr (Davlatov & Mamadšoev, 2012).
The most contradictory and doubtful part of this version is the inclu-
sion of Izotullo Haëev to the list of unrest organisers. Haëev was one of 
the three republic’s leaders, along with Mahkamov and Pallaev, and was 
forced to resign following the demonstrators’ demands. Does this mean 
tСat HaщОv organТsОН СТs oаn НТsmТssal? DuО to tСО НТscrОpancТОs of tСТs 
version, the General Prosecutor refused to imprison the conspirators and 
oficТallв closОН tСО casО НОspТtО strong prОssurО from tСО kgb, which per-
sistently insisted that the investigation results must fully comply with the 
Plenum decisions (idem).
Version 4: the kgb Central Apparatus.
The proponents of this version consider that the February events were 
organised with the aim of preventing the ascension of Rastokhez to the 
Supreme Soviet, where it could form a considerable parliamentary faction. 
It is assumed that the kgb’s initial intention was to organise controlled 
disturbances of nationalistic, reprehensible and disgusting character, and 
blame Rastokhez for the organisation, thus discrediting the party on the 
eve of the elections. At the same time, it would provide security agencies 
with a legal reason to suppress the movement or at least reject its applica-
tТon for oficТal rОgТstratТon. As onО of tСО rОsponНОnts statОН:
The organisers’ initial plan failed because demonstrators very soon moved 
away from the subject of refugees and rallied against the government. They 
were no longer in control of the demonstration which assumed a more 
political and anti-government character instead of the intended purely 
nationalistic one.15
This version is often regarded as another variant of the conspiracy theo-
ry. In light of the well-known distrust of such theories within academic 
15 Interview with a former Rastokhez leader, July 2013.
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circles, it is not seriously accepted outside Tajikistan. Initially, it was not 
popular in Tajikistan either, but opinions have changed in the last decade, 
both in the public opinion and among the local expert and journalist com-
munity. The wider acceptance of this version could be considered as a 
publТc rОsponsО to tСО unsounНnОss of oficТal ОбplanatТons.
On tСО otСОr СanН, publТc opТnТon maв СavО bООn ТnluОncОН bв a sОrТОs 
of data and information that has only recently been revealed. Consequently, 
local proponents of the “kgb involvement theory” can today rely on 
a much broader range of arguments than ever before. For instance, ‘the 
conspiracy theory’ was initially based only on the testimony of the Tajik 
kgb oficОr AbНullo Naгarov, аСo, Тn 1990, opОnlв accusОН tСО sОcurТtв 
agОncТОs of organТsТng tСО ОvОnts (Panilov, 1992). But latОr, SolТНžon 
DžuraОv, СОaН of tСО GОnОral ProsОcutor joТnt ТnvОstТgatТon tОam, opОnlв 
stated that his inquiry revealed the kgb’s direct engagement in the prepara-
tion of the events, as well as the large scale fabrication of data (Davlatov & 
Mamadšoev, 2012). Even former cpt First Secretary Kahhor Mahkamov 
admitted in one of his recent interviews that the February events were pre-
pared and organised by the central structures of the kgb in cooperation 
аТtС somО oficТals (Anonвmous, 2011a).
As early as 1991, the Supreme Soviet investigators blamed the kgb 
leadership for not allowing them to interview its employees. In addition, 
the kgb refused to disclose a range of documents, video recordings and 
a three-hour documentary on the February events. The commission also 
stated that the kgb overlooked a series of warnings about the upcoming 
events, as for instance the following case:
On January 25, 1990, one of the high-ranking members the cpt Central 
Committee informed A. Dadabaev, Secretary of the Central Committee, that 
a group of Azerbaijan’s emissaries had arrived in Dushanbe and was conduc-
ting anti-party propaganda. Dadabaev immediately passed this information 
on to the leaders of the Tajik kgb (Nazriev & Sattorov, 2002, p. 171).
The kgb leadership was therefore informed of the ongoing propaganda 
activities and unrest preparation two weeks ahead of the disturbances. And 
this warning could not be overlooked as, according to the Soviet adminis-
trative rules, any information passed on from the Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the cpt was considered priority and required immediate 
reaction (idem). АСв аОrО no prОvОntТvО mОasurОs takОn? АСв nonО of 
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the Azerbaijan’s group members were detained or even investigated by the 
Soviet kgb, ОТtСОr Тn TajТkТstan or Тn AгОrbaТjan? For ТnstancО, Тt аoulН 
not СavО bООn НТficult to inН tСОТr namОs anН aННrОssОs from tСО aТrlТnО 
registration lists.
The role of local criminal groups in the disturbances was also surpri-
sТnglв ТgnorОН. AccorНТng to botС oficТal anН unoficТal sourcОs, tСО crТ-
minal group Vodonasos, led by Rauf Saliev and Âkub Salimov, played an 
important role in mobilising the city youth. Both criminal leaders and their 
group members remained in the square during the entire demonstration 
and, according to numerous witness testimonies, criminals were actually 
runnТng tСО НОmonstratТon НurТng tСО irst tаo Нaвs (Davlat NuralТ, 2013). 
After the events, Rauf Saliev was arrested and spent several months in 
НОtОntТon Тn RussТa but аas soon rОlОasОН. TСО quОstТon Тs аСв all oficТal 
sources and investigation teams disregarded the role of the criminals and 
concОntratОН onlв on tСО opposТtТon?
IntОrОstТnglв, nonО of tСО sОnТor oficТals of tСО TajТk kgb were puni-
shed or even reprimanded for the February unrest. Quite the contrary, they 
successfully continued their careers, with awards and promotions.16 Such 
an indulgent attitude does not correspond to the historically established 
image of the Soviet intelligence service, well-known for stern internal dis-
cipline, rigorous requirements and strict attitude towards its employees, 
where a minor mistake could cost a career if not a reprimand.
There are still a number of people in Tajikistan who oppose this version, 
mostly among representatives of the local Russian speaking population, 
the elder generations and dedicated communists. Unfortunately, their 
objections have a more ideological and emotional character than a rational 
one. Such a reaction is understandable since, for many ordinary citizens 
born in the Soviet Union, and especially Russians, it is almost impossible 
to accept the idea of the kgb involvement. This would mean that the kgb 
and the central authorities actually provoked anti-Russian disturbances, 
16 For instance, the head of the Tajik kgb Vladimir Petkel’ was promoted to the central kgb 
structures in Moscow, where he became a close cadre of ussr kgb СОaН VlaНТmТr Krûčkov. 
In August 1991, a day before the failed coup in Moscow, Petkel’ visited Dushanbe to meet 
his successor Strojkin. During a parliamentary session, the deputies of the Tajik Supreme 
Soviet stated that Petkel’ brought with him a secret plan aimed at supporting the Moscow 
coup and in case of success, the kgb would implement a plan of arresting 1,100 people 
(Salimi, 2012).
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letting down intentionally the local Russian community for the sake of 
some top level political interests.
Conclusions
It rОmaТns НТficult to sustaТn аСТcС vОrsТon Тs closОr to rОalТtв as tСОrО 
Тs stТll ТnsuficТОnt rОlТablО anН conirmОН ТnformatТon on tСО ОvОnts. 
However, the existing data allows us to draw several conclusions.
FТrstlв, all ТnvОstТgatТon commТssТons ОstablТsСОН bв oficТal anН cТvТc 
institutions during and after the events have come to the same conclusion 
that the public disturbances in Dushanbe were not spontaneous, but well-
planned, professional and thoroughly prepared actions. In this regard, the 
various investigation commissions highlighted the following evidences 
and facts to prove the organised character of the disturbances:
• Investigators pointed a well organised propaganda campaign, with a 
consТНОrablО amount of prО-prОparОН matОrТal, ТncluНТng lОalОts anН 
proclamations, widely distributed starting from January 20.
• There was a series of informal and formal gatherings in various public 
placОs anН ТnstТtutТons, ТncluНТng oficТal anН unoficТal mosquОs, unТ-
versities and students’ dormitories, where people were called on to 
participate in protests.
• There were informal gatherings of criminal leaders, from at least two 
main groups in Dushanbe, with a view to preparing disturbances.
• Special propaganda groups had been actively instigating demons-
tration during the four weeks prior to the events, including a group 
from Azerbaijan, which allegedly arrived in Dushanbe before the 
disturbances.
• The exact date of the demonstration was widely known to the public at 
lОast tаo аООks bОforО tСО ОvОnts, bОcausО of lОalОt НТstrТbutТon.
• DОmonstrators usОН stonОs, stООl stТcks (ittТngs) anН otСОr sТmТlar 
devices that had been delivered by trucks to Lenin square at the begin-
nТng of НТsturbancОs (Ânovskaс, 2010). DurТng tСО irst Нaв, tСО croаН 
fought against soldiers and policemen using special equipment such as 
steel loops (lassos), which need time and preparation to produce.
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SОconНlв, nonО of tСО ТnvОstТgatТon tОams coulН inН ОvТНОncО to provО 
the Democrats (Rastokhez) and Islamists’ involvement in the organisation 
of the events. The version of an alleged internal coup was also said to 
be unfounded. In fact, all versions initially developed and promoted by 
the investigation teams led by the kgb and the Tajik Prosecutor had been 
discredited as early as the end of 1990.
With this in mind, the argument that the Soviet kgb was directly or 
indirectly responsible for the February events remains the only credible 
version. This version has generated increasing debates in Tajikistan, with 
new data and information being disclosed by investigators in the course 
of the last decade. Today, the proponents of this version argue as follows. 
Firstly, there are many evidences that the Tajik kgb was aware of the upco-
ming disturbances. According to the Supreme Soviet investigation com-
mission, the kgb overlooked a series of applications and warnings. The 
propaganda actions taken against Armenian refugees took place mainly in 
state universities,17 anН oficТal mosquОs, аСТcС аОrО traНТtТonallв unНОr 
the strict surveillance of the kgb. Considering that the network of kgb 
informants amounted to between 400,000 and 2.9 million people (Albats, 
1995, p. 68), including cases of “socially dangerous elements,” such as 
national and religious groups, the number of informants represented one 
Тn a СunНrОН cТtТгОns (MakarОvТč, 2015, p. 42). TСОrОforО, tСО kgb did not 
overlook the warnings and data on the upcoming disturbances but purpose-
fully disregarded them for purely political concerns. Secondly, the propo-
nents of this version give particular weight to the recently revealed conclu-
sions of the General Prosecutor joint investigation team, which stated that 
none of the three versions promoted by the kgb were sustainable due to the 
lack of evidence and accused the Tajik kgb of large scale data fabrication. 
Despite unprecedented pressure from the kgb and Tajik law enforcement 
oficТals аСo pОrsТstОntlв НОmanНОН tСО arrОst of tСО opposТtТon lОaНОrsСТp 
anН sОvОral top lОvОl oficТals, tСО rОsults of tСО ТnvОstТgatТon аОrО prО-
sented on October 10, 1990 directly to Mikhail Gorbachev and members 
of the Politburo (Davlat Nurali, 2013). Thirdly, neither the opposition nor 
a group of TajТkТstan’s oficТals СaН tСО capacТtв to mobТlТsО sucС a varТОН 
17 EacС unТvОrsТtв СaН so callОН “irst НОpartmОnts” ansаОrТng НТrОctlв to tСО kgb. Their 
task was to note the ideological mood among students and teachers. In addition, there was 
usually a group of retired kgb ОmploвООs from tСО so callОН “actТng rОsОrvО” afilТatОН to 
each university and with the same task.
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public, unconnected and ranging from criminal groups to propagandists 
from Azerbaijan. According to them, Rastokhez and Islamists were not 
able to conduct such large scale preparatory activities without exposing 
themselves to the security and law enforcement agencies. Fourthly, there 
was an increasing number of indirect evidence, such as the fact that the 
top-level Tajik kgb oficТals аОrО not rОprТmanНОН or tСО nОа statОmОnt of 
former cpt First Secretary Mahkamov, who stressed the key role of Soviet 
kgb in organising the disturbances.
The proponents of this version consider the February events in Dushanbe 
through the prism of more global changes and socio-political transforma-
tion of the Soviet Union prior to its collapse. Indeed, the Soviet kgb played 
a key role at that time as one of the main initiators of perestroika. In this 
regard, General Filipp Bobkov, former deputy Chairman of the kgb, stated: 
“Perestroika was designed not by Gorbachev but Andropov [Chairman of 
the kgb from 1967 to 1982]. Unfortunately, he did not have enough time to 
complete his grandiose plan.” The initial intention was “to return to Lenin,” 
to improve and modernise the socialist system (Bobkov, 1995, p. 363).
According to the Soviet dissident Vladimir Bukovskij, the kgb sup-
ported nationalist and liberal-democratic movements at the beginning of 
perestroika in an attempt to counterbalance and weaken the resistance of 
the most conservative circles of the Communist Party leadership. The kgb 
ТniltratОН opposТtТon movОmОnts аТtС a аТНО nОtаork of Тnformants anН 
so-callОН “agОnts of ТnluОncО” аТtС tСО aТm of controllТng tСОm. As a rОsult, 
a number of prominent national democratic leaders of the 1980s are today 
accusОН of bОТng afilТatОН аТtС tСО SovТОt sОcurТtв sОrvТcОs (GrОčОnОvskТj, 
2008). Aâz Mutalibov, President of Azerbaijan in 1990-1992, recently 
stated: “Not a single organisation in the ussr, especially an informal one, 
could be established without direct kgb participation” (Rasulzade, 2013). 
However, according to Bukovskij, with the growth and radicalisation of 
natТonal movОmОnts, tСО “agОnts of ТnluОncО” facОН a complТcatОН НТlОm-
ma, either leave the movements or become radicalised as well. Therefore, 
by the beginning of 1989, the Soviet kgb had actually lost control of the 
democratisation process, as well as the various nationalist and democratic 
groups, the majority of which assumed an open anti-Soviet and anti-com-
munist ideology with enough public support to seriously challenge local 
authorities in several Soviet republics.
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From 1988 on, the kgb completely revised its policy towards national 
democratic movements, considering them as a main threat to the stabi-
lity and integrity of the ussr. This policy change is associated with the 
igurО of Тts CСaТrman VlaНТmТr Krûčkov, аСo announcОН a largО-scalО 
campaign against the democrats and nationalist groups immediately upon 
his appointment.18 According to Boris Eltsin, ex-President of Russia, the 
kgb turned into the most backward political factor in the country, partly 
bОcausО GОnОral Krûčkov “СaН a profОssТonal НТsОasО – spв manТa […] 
he was consistently sending secret memos to Gorbachev with one line: 
‘Democrats are preparing a coup’” (El’cin, 1994, p. 80). Appealing to the 
Congress of People’s Deputies of the ussr, GОnОral Krûčkov statОН tСat 
the authorities no longer felt obliged to rely on political means alone, it 
аoulН usО forcО ОvОn at tСО rТsk of blooНsСОН. GОnОral Krûčkov aННОН 
that “the kgb mТssТon Тs to igСt agaТnst tСosО НОstructТvО forcОs tСat arО 
ОagОr to НТsТntОgratО tСО SovТОt UnТon” (StrТgТn, s.Н., p. 6). TСО task of igС-
ting against the “destructive forces” was assigned to the Fifth Ideological 
Directorate of the kgb, which was renamed as the Third Directorate for 
“Defence of Constitutional Order”19 in August 1989.
Therefore, the last phase of perestroika (1989-1991) was marked by 
a sharp confrontation between conservative pro-communist forces led by 
the kgb and oppositional nationalist and liberal organisations. This period 
started with a series of disorders throughout the Soviet Union: Baku in 
January 1989, Tbilisi in April 1989, Dushanbe in February 1990, Vilnius 
anН RТga Тn Januarв 1991. It ОnНОН Тn August 1991 аТtС GОnОral Krûčkov’s 
unsuccessful coup, and was followed by the dissolution of the ussr. It 
was a period when the pro-Communists attempted to regain control over 
society and prevent the collapse of Soviet power in the national republics. 
In the beginning, public disturbances led to the imposition of a state of 
emergency and political retreat of the democratic movements in the repu-
blics. However, in Lithuania and Latvia this retreat was only temporary 
and, soon, the local pro-Soviet forces suffered ultimate political defeat. 
18 GОnОral Krûčkov аas appoТntОН to tСО posТtТon of CСaТrman of tСО kgb in 1989. He was 
dismissed after leading the unsuccessful pro-communist coup in August 1991.
19 It is worth noting that three years later, during the Tajik civil war (1992-1997), the 
pСrasО “НОfОncО of constТtutТonal orНОr” аas usОН as a prТmarв oficТal slogan of tСО pro-
communist People’ s Front, which fought against the United Tajik Opposition, an alliance 
of the Tajik Islamist and democrats.
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In Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, the elections held in a state of emergency 
led to creation of national parliaments dominated by the Communists. In 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, the internal political struggle conti-
nued for several years, even after the collapse of the ussr, with violent 
conlТcts, аСОrО Moscoа consТstОntlв supportОН consОrvatТvО pro-com-
munist forces. There are several similarities between the public disorders 
that took place in 1988-1991. For instance, a group of agents of the kgb 
lОН bв GОnОral VorotnТkov, irst НОputв СОaН of tСО FТftС Directorate, were 
present in all these disturbances (Udmancev, 2004). And a same group of 
senior cp oficТals anН spОcТal forcО oficОrs аas also actТvОlв ОngagОН Тn 
all the violent events, including Boris Pugo, Chairman of the cp Control 
Commission and Minister of Interior of the ussr,20 and Colonel Mikhail 
Golovatov, head of the “Alfa” special force unit.21 The link between the 
kgb and public disturbances during the last phase of perestroika remains 
unclОar anН ТnsuficТОntlв ОбplorОН.
Regarding the February events in Dushanbe, the actual degree of kgb 
involvement remains unanswered. Most evidence and data in favour of the 
“kgb НТrОct ОngagОmОnt vОrsТon” arО of ТnНТrОct cСaractОr. OpОnТng up ofi-
cial archives may shed light on this version but the Tajik kgb archives are 
reported to have been burned during the civil war (1992-1997). Hopefully 
over the years, new information and data about the February events will be 
disclosed and available for scholars and the wider public.
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Abstract
The series of large-scale disturbances that took place in Dushanbe in February 
1990 are considered today as one of the most violent public disorders of the last 
НОcaНО of tСО SovТОt UnТon. AccorНТng to oficТal Нata, tСО rТots аОrО causОН bв 
the spread of rumours suggesting that several thousand Armenian refugees were 
provided with housing at the expense of local families. However, the disturbances 
almost immediately assumed an open anti-government and political character lea-
ding to street violence and clashes.
There has been little in-depth coverage of the February events. Despite a growing 
number of publications, there is still a rather vague understanding of the causes 
and internal and external driving forces. All investigation commissions and jour-
nalists have agreed that these events were not spontaneous but rather the result 
of a аОll-plannОН anН tСorougСlв organТsОН actТon. HoаОvОr, nonО of tСО oficТal 
investigations have provided an answer to the most important question: what 
forcОs аОrО bОСТnН tСО ОvОnts? аСo organТsОН tСО НТsturbancОs? Сoа, anН for аСat 
rОasons? АТtС tСТs Тn mТnН, tСО aТm of tСТs papОr Тs to ОбplorО anН analвsО tСО 
different interpretations of the February events.
Keywords: February events, social disturbances, kgb, Tajikistan.
Résumé
Les événements de 1990 р Douchanbé : qui était en coulisse? Eбamen des princi-
pales versions
La série de troubles qui se sont déroulées à Douchanbé en février 1990 sont 
considérées aujourd’hui comme l’un des désordres publics les plus violents de la 
НОrnТчrО НцcОnnТО НО l’UnТon sovТцtТquО. SОlon lОs НonnцОs oficТОllОs, lОs цmОutОs 
ont été causées par la propagation de rumeurs suggérant que plusieurs milliers de 
réfugiés arméniens avaient reçu des logements aux dépens des familles locales. 
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Mais les troubles ont presque immédiatement pris un caractère anti-gouvernemen-
tal et politique, menant à la violence et aux affrontements de rue.
Ces événements de février n’ont pas fait l’objet de recherches approfondies. 
Malgré un nombre croissant de publications récentes, il existe encore une com-
préhension assez vague de leurs causes internes et externes. Les commissions 
d’enquête et les journalistes sont d’accord sur le fait que ces événement n’étaient 
pas spontanцs maТs plutôt lО rцsultat Н’unО actТon planТiцО Оt bТОn organТsцО. 
CОpОnНant, aucunО НОs ОnquшtОs oficТОllОs n’a fournТ НО rцponsО auб prТncТpalОs 
quОstТons : quОllОs forcОs sО cacСaТОnt НОrrТчrО lОs цvцnОmОnts? QuТ a organТsц lОs 
troublОs? CommОnt, Оt pour quОllОs raТsons? L’objОctТf НО cОt artТclО Оst Н’ОбplorОr 
et d’analyser les différentes interprétations des événements de février.
Mots-clцs: événements de février, troubles sociaux, kgb, Tajikistan
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